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Abstract
An Open Network Handle System (ONHS) provides an intermediate
level of service between IP numbers and domain names. A handle adheres
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permanently to an owner, who may assign and reassign it to different ad-
dresses at will. But a handle is a number, carrying no significance in
natural language. Any user desiring a handle may generate one from a
public key. This memo describes a simple implementation of an Open Net-
work Handle System using the security extensions to the Domain Name
System (DNSSEC).
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1 Introduction
Open Network Handle System (ONHS) Handles are hierarchical lists of tokens,
much like domain names except that individual labels are numerical, and carry
no significance in natural language. Certain handle labels are constrained to
contain certain types of cryptographic public keys.
1.1 Handles Provide Persistence, Not Meaning
A conventional domain name provides two different types of value:
O’Donnell Informational [Page 3]
Internet Draft (0.4) Open Network Handles in DNS September 5 2002
• It provides persistent reference to a particular network agent as the agent’s
IP address changes.
• It has some human meaning related to the owner, making it easier than a
meaningless token to remember, communicate, and guess.
Handles are intended to provide only the first type of value: persistent refer-
ence. Because they carry no intuitive human meaning, all handles are essentially
equally valuable. Handle ownership should attract very little dispute. In the ab-
sence of dispute handle assignment may be completely automated, and human
administration of the handle system may be minimized. Most handle owners
will probably take steps outside of ONHS to connect their handles to domain
names and/or other sources of human meaning.
The proposed Open Network Handle System is intended to provide the min-
imal service needed so that individual users of the Internet may enjoy the value
of persistent reference through handles. Each handle owner is entirely responsi-
ble for using public-key cryptography to generate and defend her handles, and
for announcing correct information to resolve handles to addresses. ONHS only
tries to provide prompt and correct resolutions of handles to addresses with high
probability, in order to establish contact between parties interested in commu-
nicating. All other issues must be addressed by the parties themselves through
their direct communications, or through other services outside of ONHS.
In particular, ONHS does not certify the correctness of individual reso-
lutions. Queriers and handle owners are entirely responsible for establishing
whatever level of authenticity they require. Since ONHS handle are hash codes
of cryptographic public keys, queriers and handle owners may choose to use
that key for their own authentication if they deem the threats to be relatively
light. This separation of responsibility allows each pair of corresponding querier
and handle owner to determine their own criteria for satisfactorily authentic
communication.
From the point of view of users, ONHS provides a location service, not an
authentication service. ONHS uses authentication techniques in its operations,
but they are there to improve the rate of correct resolutions, not to guarantee
authenticity of individual resolutions.
In the presence of an ONHS system that resolves handles to addresses, and
other systems, such as the Domain Name System (DNS), that resolve meaningful
names, we may bind names to handles instead of to addresses. The name
systems may concentrate on issues to do with meaning at any given time. The
persistence of handles provides no meaning on its own, but allows users to
accumulate meaning over long sequences of transactions, including transactions
involving the resolution of meaningful names into handles.
1.2 Handle Values
A handle value encodes a complete method for authenticating bindings to the
handle. Handle values are hierarchical sequences of handle labels, analogous
O’Donnell Informational [Page 4]
Internet Draft (0.4) Open Network Handles in DNS September 5 2002
to domain name values. A useful implementation should support at least two
types of handle labels:
• A hashed public-key (PK) label consists of a code indicating that it is a
PK label, a code describing a public-key authentication algorithm and a
hash function, along with the hash code of the public key.
• An inherited-authority (IA) label inherits its authentication from the near-
est ancestor of another type. It consists of a code indicating that it is an
IA label, along with an arbitrary bit string distinguishing it from sibling
labels.
To attract users who cannot yet manage cryptographic keys effectively, we
should offer a third type of handle.
• An inherited out-of-band authenticated (OA) label is authenticated by a
third-party who checks the authenticity of updates from a putative owner
outside of ONHS, probably through some sort of password scheme. It
consists of a code indicating that it is a OA label, along with an arbitrary
bit string distinguishing it from sibling labels. The nearest ancestor with
a type other than IA determines the authentication method of the trusted
third-party.
The authentication method associated with a handle is the one specified by the
lowest label in the hierarchy.
1.3 Handle Operations
1.3.1 Updates on Handles
The owner of a handle is the agent who is able to authenticate updates, typically
by knowing the secret key corresponding to the public key whose hash code is
embedded in the handle value. A handle owner may perform the following
operations:
• create a new handle;
• assign an address temporarily to a handle;
• delegate a handle temporarily to another handle, possibly with a different
owner;
• cancel a handle irrevocably;
• transfer a handle irrevocably to another handle, usually with a different
authentication key;
• mark a handle’s security irrevocably as compromised.
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Each handle assignment, delegation, and transfer must be authenticated ac-
cording to the authentication method associated with that handle. Each handle
creation must be authenticated according to the authentication method associ-
ated with its parent. It makes sense to have two different sorts of cancellations,
one authenticated by the handle and the other by its parent.
Within a contiguous zone of handles all but the root having inherited-
authentication, handle and parent authorities are the same. The handle/parent
authority distinction is only important at the boundaries of zones of authenti-
cation authority.
1.3.2 Resolution Queries on Handles
Any participant in the network may query any handle to determine the address
that it resolves to. Resolution should follow delegations and transfers on ances-
tors of the handle that is queried, as well as delegations and transfers at leaf
handles, until it reaches an address. Delegations and transfers work just like
DNAME delegations in DNS.
1.3.3 Auditing Operations on Handles
To guard against errors and misbehavior by name servers, and against evildo-
ers spoofing name servers and/or handle owners, ONHS should be as publicly
auditable as feasible. On an item-by-item basis, any party may query a name
server for an individual record of creation, assignment, delegation, cancellation,
transfer, or compromise announcement, along with its owner-provided certificate
of authenticity. Any party may also request that a handle server authenticate
a message. But authentication by a handle server only gives assurance that the
message indeed came from that server, not that the message is correct. Such
queries may be used for spot checking, and also for retracing all of the steps in
a suspect resolution of a handle to an address.
Interested parties may request complete dynamic audit trails for particular
handles. To provide such an audit trail, a handle server should forward all
authentic updates and inauthentic attempted updates to the given handle as it
receives them. If an onerously large number of parties request dynamic audit
trails, at least one should be granted, with priority to the trail if any requested
by the handle owner.
To the extent it is feasible and affordable, handle servers should keep archival
logs of transactions for retrospective audits.
Audit operations are intended to support the integrity of handle resolution.
The ONHS is responsible for resolving handles promptly to correct addresses
with high probability, and with keeping the rate of erroneous resolutions low.
ONHS performance depends on a reasonable level of enforcement of authenticity,
since inauthentic updates to handles produce erroneous resolutions and prevent
correct ones. But ONHS performance does not require, nor is it intended to
provide, a high assurance of authenticity for an individual resolution of a handle
to an address.
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+-------------+
| handle root |
+-------------+
| |
+----------+ +-----------+
| |
+------+ +------+
| PK 1 | | PK 2 | ...
+------+ +------+
| | | | | |
+-------+ | | +-------+ | |
| | | | | |
| +--+ +---+ | +--+ +---+
| | | | | |
+----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+
| IA | | IA | | IA | | IA | | IA | | IA |
| 11 | | 12 | ... | 1m | | 21 | | 22 | ... | 2n |
+----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+
Figure 1: Recommended 2-level handle hierarchy
Queriers and handle owners should take their own end-to-end steps to achieve
a satisfactory level of assurance of quality for each of their mutual transactions.
When queriers and handle owners judge their vulnerability to be low, they may
use public keys taken from handles for these purposes. But when assurance of
authenticity and/or other qualities is important, and when there is a serious
threat of attack, they should use independently stored additional cryptographic
keys, and other resources that they obtain outside of ONHS. In particular, cor-
respondents who engage in a series of important communications should use
ONHS only to make efficient connections. They should store additional cryp-
tographic keys and other resources to authenticate their communications com-
pletely independently.
2 Recommended Uses of Handles
2.1 Organizing Handles to Reflect Authority Hierarchies
While domain name hierarchies reflect both hierarchies of authority and hierar-
chies of meaning, handle hierarchies should reflect only hierarchies of authority.
Therefore a typical handle owner should own one top-level public-key handle
for each public key that she wishes to use, plus one level of inherited-authority
handles below each public-key handle. Figure 1 shows the recommended two-
level handle hierarchy. PK 1 and PK 2 are public-key handles, while IA 11, IA
12, IA 1m, IA 21, IA 22, IA 2n are inherited-authority handles.
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+-------------+
| handle root |
+-------------+
| |
+----------+ +-----------+
| |
+------+ +------+
| PK 1 | | PK 2 | ...
+------+ +------+
| | | | | |
+-------+ | | +-------+ | |
| | | | | |
| +--+ +---+ | +--+ +---+
| | | | | |
+----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+
| IA | | IA | | IA |=====>| IA | | IA | | IA |
| 11 | | 12 | ... | 1m | del | 21 | | 22 | ... | 2n |
+----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+
| |
| +---------+
| |
+-----+ +-----+
| IA | | IA |
| 211 | ... | 21p |
+-----+ +-----+
Figure 2: Recommended delegation of authority
2.1.1 Delegation of Authority
When a handle owner wishes to delegate signing authority for a subspace of
handles, it is usually better to delegate one of her second-level IA handles to
another agent’s second-level IA handle. A handle owner may allow another
public-key handle as a descendant of her own public-key handle, unmediated by
delegation, but this allows less flexibility and I do not expect it to be common.
The target of delegation should introduce a third level of inherited-authority
handles. Figure 2 shows such a delegation as a horizontal barred arrow (==>).
Figure 3 shows the hierarchy of handles under PK 1 seen by a naive querier
who only resolves handles to addresses, ignoring authority. But bindings for IA
211 through IA 21p are authorized by the owner of PK 2, while those for IA 11,
IA 12, ... IA 1m are authorized by the owner of PK 1.
Further delegations can create an arbitrarily deep visible handle hierarchy
with only three levels of hierarchy in the delegationless structure. Notice that
depth in such a visible hierarchy comes only from the hierarchy of delegation
of authority. Other organizational hierarchy may be indicated outside of the
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|
+------+
| PK 1 | ...
+------+
| | |
+-------+ | |
| | |
| +--+ +---+
| | |
+----+ +----+ +----+
| IA | | IA | | IA |
| 11 | | 12 | ... | 1m |
+----+ +----+ +----+
| |
| +---------+
| |
+-----+ +-----+
| IA | | IA |
| 211 | ... | 21p |
+-----+ +-----+
Figure 3: Visible handle hierarchy from Figure 2
handle system.
Three levels of delegationless structure, along with delegations from the sec-
ond and third levels to the second level, suffice to represent an arbitrary tree-
shaped hierarchy of authority. The sources of delegations may be arbitrarily
deep in the visible hierarchy, but the target of a delegation should always be a
newly created handle at the second level of the delegationless structure.
Three delegationless levels, plus delegations similar to those in Figures 1-4,
suffice for all of the authority structures that occur to me so far. Figure 4 shows
a structure in which the owner of PK 2 exercises some authority delegated by PK
1, some authority delegated by PK 3, and some authority that simultaneously
serves PK 1 and PK 3. IA 212 and IA 231 both delegate to IA 22. There should
be more handles below IA 22, but I ran out of space in the picture.
I recommend that users go as far as possible with the minimum number of
levels: two for many purposes, three for delegations of authority. But it seems
prudent to leave the system open to more levels for purposes conceived in the
future.
2.1.2 Password Authentication Using an OA Hierarchy
As soon as public-key software with easy user interfaces is widely deployed, we
should abandon the use of password authenticated handles. But for a user who
would like the benefit of a handle, and whose handle is not valuable enough to
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+-------------+
| handle root |
+-------------+
| | |
+---------------+ | +---------------+
| | |
+------+ +-------+ +------+
| PK 1 | | PK 2 | | PK 3 |
+------+ +-------+ +------+
| | | | | | |
+-------+ | +----+ | +----+ | +------+
| | | | | | |
+----+ +----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +----+ +----+
| IA | | IA |=====>| IA | | IA | | IA |<=====| IA | | IA |
| 11 | ... | 1m | del | 21 | | 22 | | 23 | del | 31 | ... | 3m |
+----+ +----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +----+ +----+
| | ^ ^ | |
+---+ | " " | +---+
| | " " | |
+-----+ +-----+ " " +-----+ +-----+
| IA | | IA |=+ +=| IA | | IA |
| 211 | | 212 | del | 231 | | 232 |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
Figure 4: Overlapping delegations of authority
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+-------------+
| handle root |
+-------------+
|
|
|
+------+
| PK 1 | ...
+------+
| | |
+-------+ | |
| | |
| +--+ +---+
| | |
+----+ +----+ +----+
| OA | | OA | | OA |
| 11 | | 12 | ... | 1m |
+----+ +----+ +----+
| |
+---+ +----+
| |
+-----+ +-----+
| IA | | IA |
| 211 | ... | 21p |
+-----+ +-----+
Figure 5: Recommended password-authentication hierarchy
others to invite attack, password authentication is a good interim method. The
implementor of a password authentication hierarchy may use email confirmation
or other techniques to improve the security of password-authenticated updates.
An agent who wishes to offer password authenticated handles should claim
a new public-key handle and create a two-level hierarchy of the PK handle with
OA handles as children, as shown in Figure 5.
ONHS treats OA handles exactly the same as IA handles, since it only has
access to public-key signatures and not to the password file. But an agent who
operates a password-authenticated handle service, and who takes no responsi-
bility for the behavior of the OA handle owners, should mark those handles OA
to warn the public that her PK authority is only intended to authenticate the
receipt of updates with correct passwords, not to take credit or blame for the
behavior of the agent with the OA handle.
Each OA handle owner should establish a level of IA handles, just like a PK
handle owner.
A corporate agent may use password authentication internally to delegate
authority for updates on certain handles to subordinates. As long as the cor-
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porate agent wants credit for the behavior of the subordinates, and accepts
the risk of blame, she should mark the subordinate handles as IA. The IA vs.
OA distinction indicates the authority relationship, rather than the technical
mechanisms used in generating authentic updates.
A querier who discovers an address for an OA handle should not use the
public key associated with the signature on handle updates for communications
with the handle owner. Such a use is reasonable for PK and IA handles.
2.1.3 Upgrading a Key or Selling a Handle by Irrevocable Transfer
Although irrevocable transfer of a handle is essentially the same as temporary
delegation in terms of the data structure that represents it, the natural use of
irrevocable transfer is quite different, and it calls for different policy.
2.1.3.1 Upgrading a Key
The technical device of using a public key as a handle works only as long
as the key, and the cryptographic technique that it uses, remain reasonably se-
cure. Over a long period of time, a handle owner will often need to create one
long-lived virtual handle by connecting old handles to newer ones as the old
ones become obsolete. For handles with relatively low traffic and low commer-
cial value, individual keys may be viable longer than common security practice
suggests. But it is likely that all cryptographic techniques (at given key sizes)
known today will eventually become obsolete due to advances in mathematics
and increases in computing speed.
There appears to be no perfect method for transferring authority from an
obsolescent key to a new and stronger one. The ONHS can provide key owners
with a significant window of time for such a transfer, and can help to advertise
the transfer to queriers.
Long before a given key K1 becomes compromised or otherwise obsolete,
and as soon as a stronger encryption technique (or just a longer key) becomes
practicable, the owner of K1 should perform the following steps to transfer it.
• Claim a new public-key handle with key K2, using the strongest encryption
that is affordable at the time.
• Copy the hierarchy of inherited-authority handles below K1 to a corre-
sponding hierarchy below K2. Keep the numerical values for the copied
handles the same, not just the topological structure.
• Replicate the address bindings, delegation structure, and any other in-
formation associated with the hierarchy below K1 in the hierarchy below
K2.
• Redirect delegations from the same owner’s other handles to use the hier-
archy below K2 in place of the hierarchy below K1. In principle, this step
may be delayed as long as K1 remains usable, but it seems best to do it
now.
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• Contact other handle owners who have delegated authority into the hier-
archy below K1, and instruct them to redirect to the hierarchy below K2.
The owner of K1/K2 may not know the identities of all such other owners,
but she probably knows those who are most important to her. In principle
this step may be delayed, or even left to the diligence of the other handle
owners, but it is probably best in most cases to do it now.
• Verify through test queries that the hierarchy below K2 is satisfactory.
• Perform an irrevocable transfer of K1 to K2.
Because the impact of irrevocable transfer on pure handle-to-address resolu-
tion is the same as the impact of temporary delegation, queriers of the hierar-
chy below K1 will be forwarded to the hierarchy below K2. But handle servers
should also report the transfer to each querier, and each querier should replace
all current references to K1 with references to K2.
The owner of K1/K2 should also advertise the transfer through any other
available channels and encourage all correspondents to update references from
K1 to K2. She may use an audit trail of queries on K1 to discover naive queriers
and encourage them to update to K2. If ONHS gains widespread use, application
software (such as Web browsers) should automate update of transferred handles,
probably with notification to and confirmation by the user.
Later, when the owner of K1/K2 decides that the appropriate balance be-
tween risk of compromise to K1 and risk of losing correspondents has passed,
she should:
• Cancel K1 irrevocably.
If she believes that K1 has been compromised, then she should also mark it as
compromised.
Notice that temporary delegation should normally be applied to an IA handle
below a PK handle, but irrevocable transfer for key upgrade should normally
be applied to a PK handle. Figure 6 shows the recommended structure for key
upgrade.
2.1.3.2 Selling a Handle
Irrevocable transfer may also be used to transfer a handle to a new owner, for
example as part of the sale of a portion of a company’s business. In this case,
the steps outlined in 2.1.3.1 above divide naturally into those performed by the
donor and those performed by the recipient. In the case of the sale of a portion
of a company’s business, the transfer will usually go from a subsidiary IA handle
in the donor’s hierarchy to a subsidiary IA handle in the recipient’s hierarchy.
The recipient should verify by a test query that the donor actually executed
the transfer. Since the recipient has an incentive to enforce the transfer, while
the donor may have no such incentive, or even a counterincentive, the recipient
should archive a signed record of the transfer, and should audit activity on the
donor key. For transfers of valuable handles, the parties should use certification
services outside of ONHS to record and enforce conditions of the transfer.
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+-------------+
| handle root |
+-------------+
| |
+----------+ +---------------------+
| |
+------+ +------+
| PK 1 |===============================>| PK 2 |
+------+ irrevocable transfer +------+
| | | | | |
+-------+ | | +-------+ | |
| | | | | |
| +--+ +---+ | +--+ +---+
| | | | | |
+----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+
| IA | | IA | | IA |==> ... | IA | | IA | | IA |==> ...
... ==>| 11 | | 12 | ... | 1m | ... ==>| 11 | | 12 | ... | 1m |
+----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+
| | | |
| +---------+ | +---------+
| | | |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
| IA | | IA | | IA | | IA |
| 111 | ... | 11p | | 111 | ... | 11p |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
Figure 6: Recommended transfer for key upgrade
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2.2 Resolving Domain Names to Handles
Hierarchies of domain names should reflect a variety of hierarchies of mean-
ing. Some hierarchies of meaning, such as an organizational hierarchy for a
corporation, may correspond closely with hierarchies of authority. But many
or most hierarchies of meaning, such as the hierarchy of products and services
offered to a customer, may have a very different structure from the authority
structure. Even structures of corporate authority may not match up perfectly
with the technical authority over cryptographic keys for handles that drives the
handle hierarchy and delegation structure. So a user of both handles and names
should develop the structure of each independently, then provide information to
resolve names to handles. In a rough analogy to programming language compil-
ers, we may think of domain names as analogous to identifiers or variable names,
handles as analogous to symbol table entries, and IP numbers as analogous to
memory addresses.
When a user of both DNS and ONHS creates a new leaf domain name in
DNS, she should usually create a new corresponding handle to track its value.
That handle should usually not be a public-key handle, but rather an inherited-
authority handle below a public-key handle, so that the holder of that public
key may perform other roles associated with other handles. Occasionally, there
may already be a handle appropriate to the new name. But users should make
multiple references from different names to the same handle only when the dif-
ferent names are intentionally synonymous, not just accidentally equivalent for
the moment. For example, president.example.com and treasurer.example.com
should map to different handles representing the different roles of the offices,
even though a single person holds both offices at the moment.
In Section 3 we see that a handle system may be implemented as a contiguous
set of zones in DNS. In that case the mapping of domain names to handles may
be accomplished with DNAME resource records.
On the other hand, the assignment of a handle to a name should change
very seldom. Changes in the way that the meaning of the name is deployed
in the world (a new person taking over the role referred to by the name, the
office referred to by the name moving to a new building, ...) should usually be
reflected by reassignments of the handle. When example chooses a new presi-
dent, the handle associated with president.example.com should be redelegated
or reassigned, rather than the name president.example.com. The authority for
that redelegation presumably comes from example’s board of directors.
The handle associated with a name should change only when there is a
change of cryptographic key, a permanent change of authority over the handle,
an essential change in the meaning of the name (e.g., a change in the dictionary
meaning of the name), or for some other reason the structure of handle space
must change. The ONHS is designed to allow users to set up structures that
avoid the need for restructuring (address assignment and delegation don’t count
as restructuring), but surely the system and the users will fail in some cases.
Although a change of cryptographic key (either because the old key is overused,
or to upgrade to stronger cryptographic techniques) and a permanent change
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in the authority over a handle probably require a change in the name-handle
assignment, even that change is partly supported by ONHS. In such a case, the
owner of the handle should announce a permanent transfer of the handle. Such
a transfer affects all future resolutions of the old handle to an address, but ev-
eryone who refers to the old handle should also update that reference to use the
new handle as soon as he discovers the transfer. By contrast, a temporary del-
egation of authority is completely transparent (except for auditing purposes),
and someone who queries a handle and discovers a temporary delegation to
another handle should usually not update his own reference.
I re-emphasize that ONHS only provides a tool by which agents may point
to addresses by binding their handles, and queriers may locate those addresses
by querying handle servers to resolve those handles. ONHS does nothing to
ensure the semantic correctness of the resolvent. If example.com binds presi-
dent.example.com to a handle that is intended to track the company’s president,
ONHS does nothing to help make sure that the handle is indeed bound to the
legitimate president. It merely resolves the handle according to whatever cor-
rectly signed bindings it has received.
Notice that delegations and transfers in ONHS are exposed to the same
potential for circularity as DNAME delegations in DNS. But a policy of always
delegating to a newly created IA child avoids cycles among handles, even when
there is a cycle of delegation among handle owners. Figure 7 shows a cyclic
delegation of authority between the owners of PK 1 and PK 2, with no actual
cycle of delegation among handles.
3 Handle Zones in DNS
A name server in DNS may act as an ONHS handle server essentially by restrict-
ing its behavior on one or more zones to support only valid handle operations.
A ”handle zone” is any DNS zone in which domains are restricted to be handles.
The technical requirements of ONHS match up very closely with the standards
for DNS [DNS] with the security extensions [DNSSEC]. I noticed two points
in which the technical concepts of ONHS are skewed slightly (and I believe
harmlessly) with respect to the nearly analogous DNS concepts.
• DNS zones are simultaneously zones of authority over a portion of the
name space, and zones of responsibility for providing resolution informa-
tion within the same portion. In ONHS, a zone of contiguous inherited-
authority handles, rooted at a public-key handle, forms a zone of authority
for authenticating update transactions. It is generally good management
practice to keep responsibility and authority in close correspondence, but
resource availability will probably lead to informal agreements and con-
tracts whereby a separately controlled handle server resolves all or part of
a zone of public-key authentication authority on behalf of the authority.
In such a case, the DNS zone corresponds to the zone of responsibility
for resolution, and the operator of the name server for the zone merely
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+-------------+
| handle root |
+-------------+
| |
+----------+ +-----------+
| |
+------+ +------+
| PK 1 | | PK 2 | ...
+------+ +------+
| | | | | |
+-------+ | | +-------+ | |
| | | | | |
| +--+ +---+ | +--+ +---+
| | | | | |
+----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+
| IA | | IA | | IA |=====>| IA | | IA | | IA |
| 11 | | 12 |<=+ | 1m | del | 21 | | 22 | ... | 2n |
+----+ +----+ " +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+
| | " | |
| | +============+ | +---------+
| | del " | |
| +---------+ " +-+ |
| | " | |
+-----+ +-----+ " +-----+ +-----+
| IA | | IA | +===| IA | | IA |
| 111 | ... | 11p | | 211 | ... | 21q |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
Figure 7: Authority circularity without handle circularity
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enters all properly certified updates from the zone authority in its tables.
Proper treatment of irrevocable transfer requires that the authentication
authority zone and the resolution responsibility zones diverge.
• The DNS security extensions [DNSSEC] conceive of signatures as cer-
tificates of authenticity provided by authoritative name servers. ONHS
conceives of its certificates as coming from handle owners, who may not
all be capable of operating their own handle servers. But the nature of
public-key certificates allows them to be copied freely, so this is a differ-
ence in description and explanation rather than in technical constraints.
A DNS name server may store certificates sent to it by other parties, after
verifying their authenticity with a public key.
There is also a radical difference between the underlying security models
motivating the design of DNSSEC vs. ONHS. DNSSEC is intended to provide
chains of trust. ONHS is intended to provide a completely distributed security
structure, with each handle owner an independent security root. (See Section
6.1 below for a more detailed comparison.) But the primitive operations on keys
and signatures in DNSSEC are flexible enough to support either model.
So, an ONHS root may essentially be implemented in a DNS zone by any
security-aware name server that is willing to administer the handle root zone
for names representing handles only. Handle owners may establish zones imme-
diately below the handle root zone. The handle root server may limit himself to
the top level of the handle zones, and leave it to each handle claimant to provide
a name server for the inherited-authenticity zone beneath her public-key handle.
Or, a particularly altruistic root server may also maintain separate zone files for
some or all handle claimants,
3.1 An Altruistic Handle Root Server
Suppose that an altruistic sponsor is willing to support a public handle sys-
tem at handleroot.example.org. The example sponsor is willing to provide
two security-aware name servers [DNSSEC] for the handle root zone contain-
ing public-key handles, and possibly for zones of inherited-authenticity handles
below the public-key handles of those handle owners who request it. It would
be a nice piece of PR to run a handle root server at a top-level domain in
DNS, such as z. or handles. or handleroot. A second-level domain such
as handleroot.org. would be slightly less nice. But any stable domain that
doesn’t consume too many characters in the maximum length of domain names
will work.
The altruistic sponsor fulfills all correctly signed requests uncritically. It
does not check, nor take any responsibility for, the identity or good behavior
of handle owners. Handle owners may register with other systems, or use di-
rect communications with their correspondents, to establish identity or other
qualities.
A very altruistic sponsor, who might be the same as the handleroot spon-
sor, or different, may claim a top-level public key handle and implement a
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cheap or free public password-authenticated handle service below it, marking
the password-authenticated handles as OA (out-of-band authentication). Such a
sponsor should use well known techniques for receiving password-authenticated
transactions through Web forms or by email, and perhaps confirming them
further by email or other channel. Such a service may be crucial to early dis-
semination of ONHS use. But it makes no special technical demands on a DNS
implementation, so I do not treat it further in this article.
A less altruistic agency may run a proprietary handle server, with its own
handle root, by supporting whatever subset of the altruistic operations it chooses
for whatever constituency it likes.
3.2 Representing Handles by Domain Names
Each public-key handle is represented by a domain name label of the form
h1g<mmm>k<n...n>
• The initial ’h’ indicates that this is a handle, and satisfies the DNS re-
quirement that a label starts with an alphabetic character.
• The ’1’ indicates that this is a public-key handle.
• The ’g’ stands for ’algorithm’. (’a’ might be confused with the hexadecimal
digit for 11.)
• <mmm> is a decimal number of 1 to 3 digits denoting the key algorithm (with
no leading zeroes), using the same numbering in KEY RRs [DNSSEC].
• The ’k’ stands for ’key’.
• <n...n> is a suffix of the 40-digit SHA1 hash of the RSA public key in
hexadecimal (with leading zeroes, if any), containing at least 14 hexadeci-
mal digits (at least 20 is strongly recommended, and there’s nothing wrong
with using all 40).
Example 1 h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.example.org. is a public-
key handle for the signature algorithm RSA/SHA1 [RSA/SHA1], supposing that
the random number 0061A38F9A3540B9 is actually the last 16 digits of the 40-
digit hexadecimal notation for the SHA1 [SHA1] hash of an RSA [RSA] public
key.
While handle syntax is unlikely to be used spontaneously for another pur-
pose, it is not intended to mark a domain name label unambiguously as a handle.
It is the position below handleroot.example.org, and the general knowledge
that this is a root domain for an implementation of ONHS, that determines the
intention to use the domain name as a handle.
An inherited-authority handle is represented by a domain name label of the
form
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h0k<n...n>
• The initial ’h’ indicates that this is a handle, and satisfies the DNS re-
quirement that a label starts with an alphabetic character.
• The ’0’ indicates that this is an inherited-authority handle.
• The ’k’ stands for ’key’.
• <n...n> is a decimal number of 1 to 60 digits without leading zeroes.
Example 2 h0k2.h0k3.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.example.org is
inherited-authority handle number 2 below inherited-authority handle number
3 below the public-key RSA/SHA1 handle with key suffix 0061A38F9A3540B9.
3.3 Resource Records (RR) for Handle Bindings
I demonstrate the implementation of ONHS in DNS resource records through a
paradigmatic example that appears to cover the essential cases.
3.3.1 RRs in the Handle Root Zone
The handle root zone contains the following RRs, even before any handles are
claimed.
handleroot.example.org. IN SOA handleserver1 handlemaster (
1 1d 1h 1w 1h
)
handleroot.example.org. SIG SOA (
5 3 86400 20050415223412 20050401223412
handleroot.example.org.
<sig>
)
handleroot.example.org. IN NS handleserver1
handleroot.example.org. IN NS handleserver2
handleroot.example.org. SIG NS (
<params>
handleroot.example.org.
<sig>
)
handleserver1 IN A 183.021.254.010
handleserver1 SIG A (
<params>
handleroot.example.org.
<sig>
)
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handleserver2 IN A 183.021.254.020
handleserver2 SIG A (
<params>
handleroot.example.org.
<sig>
)
handleroot.example.org. IN KEY 256 3 5 (
AQPZrT453eyUm/kO7rOc0GIUd7PX3n2gueMFtIGOzSUOaOt4lmiJq7bo
Fb2p9S2hXRyqZKoD82ouRxwRqEfApYyt
)
• IN indicates the Internet protocol. The alternatives are not very relevant
today.
• The SOA (start of authority) record establishes a zone rooted at handleroot.example.org.
– The name ’handleserver1’ indicates that handleserver1.handleroot.example.org
is the primary authoritative handle/name server for the handle root
zone.
– The name ’handlemaster’ indicates that handlemaster@handleroot.example.org
is the email address of a person who will deal with correspondence
regarding the zone and its name servers.
– The ’1’ is a serial number that we increment whenever the zone data
change.
– The ’1d’ specifies a modest period of one day for refreshing data at
slave servers (mirrors). This is a public service zone, and handle own-
ers who want real quick dissemination should run their own handle
servers.
– The ’1h’ specifies a modest timeout of one hour to wait before retrying
if the server fails to respond.
– The ’1w’ is a modest timeout of one week to wait before invalidating
a slave server that cannot reach an authoritative server.
– The final ’1h’ is a default time-to-live of one hour for messages indi-
cating that a given handle cannot be resolved.
• The SIG SOA record signs the SOA record with the handle root operator’s
key.
– The ’5’ is the number for RSA/SHA1 signatures.
– The ’3’ is the number of labels in handleroot.example.org.
– The ’86400’ is a plausible initial TTL (see [DNSSEC] for the technical
reason why this is included) which has nothing special to do with
implementing ONHS.
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– The ’20050408223412’ indicates that this signature will expire at 12
seconds past 22:34 on 8 April 2005.
– The ’20050401223412’ indicates that this signature was created at
12 seconds past 22:34 on 1 April 2005. So the signature is valid for
one week.
– It’s just tedious to create plausible looking signatures, so I just use
’<sig>’ to represent the signature.
• The two NS (name server) records repeat the primary handleserver1
name server and add the alternate server handleserver2.
• The SIG NS record signs both of the NS records together. From now on, I
just use ’<params>’ to represent sensible parameters for the signature.
• The two A (address) records provide IP numbers for the name servers.
Logically, these are crucial, while the names for the name servers are
redundant. But RR syntax seems to require this indirect specification.
• The public key isn’t strictly necessary for a handle server. It is important
for handle owners to authenticate their transactions on their handles, but
their authority does not derive from the root handle server. But if the
sponsor can afford it, the root handle server should provide this defense
against spoofing.
• Similarly, the SIG records, signed with the root handle server’s key, are
not strictly necessary, but probably helpful.
For each top-level public-key handle, the handle root zone should contain a
key record. Using for example three different RSA/SHA1 keys (don’t bother to
check the hashing, it isn’t correct):
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 IN KEY (
AQOp6Lb7uQyR+4FBiTZivr2xBm5ZQYRkNbcrVHZe/S0XUBSRWyVuQdH4
DuaNnzdi/bywVFSvFCbLNcL724ECyqRV
)
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88 IN KEY (
<key>
)
h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C IN KEY (
<key>
)
This key record probably should not be signed by the handle root zone,
because DNSSEC is likely to mistake that for a certification that the key should
be trusted. (This is a tricky point, and should be reconsidered. Depending
on the behavior of other DNS name servers, there might be a small value in
authenticating that the key was received by the handle server through normal
channels.)
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The handle root zone should contain records referring to the name servers
for each handle owner’s zone. The domain names ns1 and ns2 used below
are irrelevant, but appear to be required by DNS RR syntax. ns1 and ns2
do not have to be in the handle owners’ domains, but we suppose that many
handle owners have modest resources and don’t control any other domains.
Normal zones require at least two name servers, and preferably more. But for a
small handle owner, one name server might be plenty, and all that the owner’s
resources allow. I show one and two name servers in the owner’s domain, and
three outside, for examples.
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 IN NS ns1.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 IN NS ns2.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG NS (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9
<sig>
)
ns1.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 IN A 192.253.254.21
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG A (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9
<sig>
)
ns2.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 IN A 192.253.254.22
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG A (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9
<sig>
)
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88 IN NS ns1.h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88 SIG NS (
<params>
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88
<sig>
)
ns1.h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88 IN A <ip number>
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88 SIG A (
<params>
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88
<sig>
)
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h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C IN NS exampleserver1.example.com
h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C IN NS exampleserver2.example.com
h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C IN NS exampleserver3.example.com
h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C SIG NS (
<params>
h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C
<sig>
)
exampleserver1.example.com IN A <ip number>
h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C SIG A (
<params>
h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C
<sig>
)
exampleserver2.example.com IN A <ip number>
h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C SIG A (
<params>
h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C
<sig>
)
exampleserver3.example.com IN A <ip number>
h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C SIG A (
<params>
h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C
<sig>
)
These records are signed by the handle owners. They are called ”glue” records.
• For relatively low-value and low-traffic handles, it may be reasonable to
assign validity periods much longer than usual in the <params>.
Almost all records binding handles to addresses and delegating handles to
other handles should be stored with the handle owner’s zone, with no direct
support from the handle root zone. But irrevocable transfer, cancellation, and
announcement of compromise should be stored permanently in the handle root
zone as well, since the handle owner cannot necessarily be trusted to maintain
them, and she is not the only agent risking harm if they are lost. The target of an
irrevocable transfer should also archive the signed DNAME record transferring
the handle, but to make the record effective, it must be entered in zones that
will be queried by those who still know the the source handle.
Here are records transferring the subhandle h0k1.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9,
canceling h0k1.h0k2.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9presumably because it is no longer
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useful, and canceling h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88 with an announcement that it
is compromised.
h0k1.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 DNAME h0k427.h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C
h0k1.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG DNAME (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9
)
h0k1.h0k2.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 IN A <impossible address>
h0k1.h0k2.h1g0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG A (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9
)
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88 IN TXT "Compromised 01/04/2003"
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88 SIG TXT (
<params>
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88
)
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88 IN A <impossible address>
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88 SIG A (
<params>
h1g5k93C1C124A3760B88
)
The handle root server should return a handle’s transfer, cancel, and com-
promise records in response to every query on that handle and its descendants.
In principle, additional signatures should be added here, but DNSSEC doesn’t
appear to allow them (see Section 3.6). The signatures on irrevocable opera-
tions - transfers, cancellations and compromise announcements - may have much
longer periods of validity than is usually recommended. They should be pre-
served even when they expire (eventually in a less accessible archive), because
they represent the best available information, even though the original signer
may be unable or unwilling to sign them again.
To produce authenticated negative responses to resolution queries, the han-
dle root zone should contain a complete set of signed NXT records. These are not
as valuable as the NXT records in the handle owner’s zone, signed by the handle
owner. They only authenticate the fact that the root handle server is not aware
of particular records.
3.3.2 RRs in the Handle Owner’s Zone
Each handle owner’s zone should contain its own SOA, NS and A records for
its own name servers. The NS and A records are essentially the same as the
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corresponding glue records in the handle root zone. I show only the example of
the h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 zone.
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.example.org. IN SOA ns1 hm (
1 1h 1m 1d 1m
)
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.example.org. SIG SOA (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.example.org.
<sig>
)
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.example.org IN NS ns1
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handlreoot.example.org IN NS ns2
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG NS (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.example.org.
<sig>
)
ns1 IN A 192.253.254.21
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG A (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.example.org.
<sig>
)
ns2 IN A 192.253.254.22
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG A (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.example.org.
<sig>
)
For each leaf of the inherited-authority zone below the public-key handle,
the handle owner’s zone should contain an A record and a corresponding SIG
(signature), all signed by the handle owner’s key. This is entirely the respon-
sibility of the handle owner. A handle owner’s mistakes affect the value of her
own handles, but not the integrity of the ONHS.
h0k2.h0k3.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 IN A 192.253.254.63
h0k2.h0k3.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG A (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.example.org.
<sig>
)
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h0k3.h0k3.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 IN A 192.253.254.65
h0k3.h0k3.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG A (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.example.org.
<sig>
)
• 192.253.254.63 192.253.254.65 are fictional IP numbers that the han-
dle owner might assign to these handles.
A querier’s confidence in a handle resolution does not derive from trust in the
root handle server, nor in the handle owner’s server, but from the correspondence
between the handle and the key with which it is signed. The querier must know
that the domain name is intended as a handle, and must know the rule of
correspondence between handles and keys, in order to authenticate the handle
meaningfully.
For good netizenship, the handle owner’s zone should include records an-
nouncing irrevocable transfers, cancellations, and announcements of compro-
mised keys. But since lack of these records may harm others besides the handle
owner, they should also be stored in the handle root zone. Here are exam-
ples of appropriate good netizen records for the h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 zone,
duplicating the information in the handle root zone above.
h0k1.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 DNAME h0k427.h1g5kEFA0A37BB4260D3C
h0k1.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG DNAME (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9
)
h0k1.h0k2.h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9 IN A <impossible address>
h0k1.h0k2.h1g0061A38F9A3540B9 SIG A (
<params>
h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9
)
To provide useful negative information, the handle owner should provide
complete signed NXT (next) records as well. The handle owner’s signed NXT
records provide the authoritative indication that certain handles do not exist.
3.4 Operating the Root Handle Server with BIND
Normal bind software, versions 9 and later with the security extensions, can
perform almost all update and query operations of the root handle server. Han-
dle owners may transmit appropriate signed RRs to the root handle server, who
stores them and removes outdated records, all according to normal bind opera-
tions. But before accepting a new KEY record for a PK handle, the root handle
server must verify that the handle value contains an appropriate suffix of the
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public key. That operation is not supported by bind, but it is very simple to
add code for it. In principle, once the correct KEY record is established, normal
bind operations will maintain the use of that key for operations on the PK han-
dle and the IA hierarchy below it. But for robustness, the root handle server
probably should compare the key to the PK handle suffix on every operation.
Spot check audit queries are already supported by bind. Additional code to
support audit trails will be very valuable, but not essential. Reasonable audit
archives should be arranged through bind’s logging services.
Although the handle server should check each incoming record to make sure
that the signature corresponds to the handle name, it should not concern itself
in any other way with the source of the record. A handle owner may delegate the
actual transmission of updates to any other agent. The signature, not the source
address, authenticates each update record. In particular, after an irrevocable
transfer of a handle, the recipient should archive a signed copy of the transfer
and renew it in the root handle server if it gets lost.
The handle server should return additional information very liberally. As
much as possible, it should return signatures even when they are not requested.
Chains of delegation may sometimes get too long to send in their signed entirety.
But for full support of irrevocable transfer, the handle server must return the
transfer record and its signature, as well as the address that the handle finally
resolves to. This is crucial so that the querier of a transferred handle may
update his own copy of the handle.
3.5 Reverse Mapping
Reverse mapping of hosts to handles is not a necessary part of ONHS. A root
handle server should follow the normal current best practice in reverse mapping
for the hosts in its own zones, including those hosting handle servers. But a root
handle server should not be concerned with reverse mapping of handle owner’s
hosts.
ONHS users may eventually find it convenient to assign a handle as the
canonical name of each host. If so, each handle owner should take the usual
steps to establish appropriate reverse mapping. But many handles are likely to
be associated temporarily with hosts for reasons that make reverse mapping to
them inappropriate. Even if each host has a host handle, the owner of host and
handle may prefer to use a conventional domain name as the host’s canonical
name, and associate that canonical domain name with the handle by delegation
or some other binding.
3.6 Handle Operations Imperfectly Supported by DNS
Implementation
3.6.1 Missing Operations
DNS/DNSSEC doesn’t appear to support signed cancellation directly. NXT
records provided signed information that a given handle is not currently in
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use, but that is not at all the same as permanent cancellation. We might decide
to encode cancellation through an irrevocable binding to a particular address
that would never make sense as a real handle binding (I suggested this method
in the example above). Or, we might have one phoney child handle below each
real handle, and signify cancellation of the real handle by deleting all children,
including the phoney one. I believe that a zone owner may indicate the com-
plete lack of children by a NXT record with the root domain on both sides, but I
haven’t seen a positive verification of that. A NXT record in the parent will not
do, since it must be signed by the parent’s key instead of the child zone’s.
The announcement of compromise is not supported directly. It might be
done out of band with a revocation list. It might be simulated with TXT records
(I used this method in the example).
3.6.2 Weak Support for Irrevocable Operations
In spite of the usual security reasons to time out all signatures, it seems best
to let signed irrevocable cancellations, transfers, and compromise markings live
indefinitely. The signer of an irrevocable operation may not be available to
resign it, and there seems to be more value in providing the ancient record
and letting the querier decide its value for himself, than in deleting it. In the
case of transfer, the recipient of a transfer usually has the greatest interest in
making sure that the transfer record is preserved, and the source of the transfer
may even have an interest in repudiating it. In the case of cancellation and
compromise, the owner probably has an interest in preserving the record, but
he may not be able to keep resigning.
We should assume that every key will eventually be compromised. If the
particular key is not cracked, eventually the whole cryptographic method is
likely to become obsolete due to a combination of mathematical advances and
increases in computing speed. Even so, as long as anyone is querying it, the
best remaining record associated with a handle has some value. If the value of
the handle is high enough to warrant the trouble, a trusted third party may
time-stamp and sign its final irrevocable record (presumably a transfer). That
signature may be renewed as long as warranted by the value of the handle. It
should usually use stronger cryptography than the owner’s signature.
Because the handle owner may not be able to resign these irrevocable records,
or may not have sufficient incentive to do so, they should be resigned whenever
affordable by a trusted certifier. There is a serious logistic problem in having
a distant trusted certifier resign such records meaningfully at regular intervals,
so it will be helpful to have an additional signature from the handle root zone,
which presumably will be able to resign regularly. In principle, the handle root
zone should sign the trusted certifier’s signature which signs the handle owner’s
signature. But DNSSEC doesn’t appear to support signatures on signatures.
Notice that transfer essentially provides a window of time in which agents
may query the source of the transfer and update their links to use the new
handle in place of the old. How long we wish to preserve a transfer record
depends inversely on the frequency of the slowest querier’s queries. We should
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assume that there are all sorts of valuable uses of handles other than the ones
they are first intended for, even archaeological sorts of uses. At some point,
an old handle transfer must be moved onto archival storage, but it should be
preserved somewhere as long as possible.
3.7 Other Types of Resource Records
When ONHS is implemented on top of DNS, it is straightforward for handle
owners to enter other sorts of signed records for their handles: MX (mail ex-
changer), HINFO (host information), PTR (pointer not followed in resolution),
RT (route through), TXT (uninterpreted text), WKS (well-known services). Since
handle owners operate their own name servers, there is no direct way to prevent
them from entering such records. In principle, the handle root server could de-
tect this and cut off offending handle servers, but that is probably not sensible.
In the short run, there is possible benefit, and no harm, from the use of
whatever records DNS allows as values of handles. But, if ONHS is sufficiently
successful, it should probably move to a native implementation in the future,
and such a move should not be burdened with unfortunate legacy bindings.
Records that essentially represent some sort of generalized address (MX and
RT) are likely to be supported in a future ONHS. With additional protocol
agreements at the edge of the network, TXT records may be used to implement
new experimental sorts of addresses. WKS is a marginal case. In effect it provides
an additional hierarchy of virtual handles below a given handle. It is probably
better to provide such a hierarchy explicitly in handle values or in some other
name hierarchy, such as a new ONHS zone of DNS. Handle owners probably
should eschew HINFO and PTR records for their handles.
The attachment of NS servers to leaf handles is a special case treated in
Section 3.8.
3.8 Interleaved Handle Zones and Other Zones
Conceptually, a leaf handle should resolve to the address of some sort of agent. In
the long run, these addresses should probably be generalized beyond IP numbers
to accommodate agents more loosely associated with hosts. For example, a
future ONHS should probably accommodate UDP addresses consisting of an IP
number and a port number.
It also makes perfect conceptual sense to associate an ONHS leaf handle with
a DNS name server. (Conceptually, a nonleaf handle is just a handle assigned
to another handle server.) An ONHS leaf handle associated with a DNS name
server is a leaf from the point of view of ONHS, but not from the point of view of
DNS. Such a binding is implemented by an NS record for the given leaf handle.
Since we are implementing handle servers as a special case of name servers,
leaf-to-name-server resolution allows handle zones to be interleaved freely with
other sorts of DNS zones. Such interleaving appears to be valuable, and should
be encouraged rather than discouraged.
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A DNAME record may also be used to assign a name server to a handle, when
the name server already has an independent position in the DNS name space.
The use of NS within a handle zone proposed above provides a general-purpose
DNS name server that is known only through the handle.
To maintain the conceptual clarity of the restrictions imposed by ONHS, a
handle owner should not mingle publicly advertised textual domain names as
siblings of handles within the same zone. (The syntax of RRs appears to require
domain names for name servers, but those may be conceived as private names,
or even allocated in separate nonhandle zones.)
If a single public handle service succeeds in supporting the Internet’s need
for global handles, then there will be little or no embedding of other handle
servers below textual domain names. The normal conceptual use of handles has
a name space conceptually separate from handle space, and mapped into it. If
that concept catches on, then extra handle spaces deeper in the domain name
hierarchy will probably be private ones, possibly only visible within particular
intranets. But there is no need to restrict the interleaving structure. Rather we
should experiment to discover the useful interleavings of handles and names.
3.9 Possible Future Extensions
The conceptual foundations of handle systems, and practical user-interaction
issues, suggest a number of possible future extensions and variations of ONHS.
Some of these might be implementable on future extensions to DNS, or added
to a DNS implementation by judicious interaction with non-DNS software, or
implemented in a native ONHS. All such decisions should be reserved until early
experience provides guidance.
• Conceptually, a handle is a permanent anchor for a pointer to the current
address of an agent. But not every agent is identified at a given time
with the IP number of a host. IPv6 addressing already proposes to let
IP numbers refer to multicast and anycast groups. But the ideal network
handle system should probably accommodate a greater variety of agents
not identified with hosts, possibly including:
– subhost agents, identified by a host, an application identifier, and
possibly some parameters to the application (UDP addresses are ex-
amples, where the application is identified with a port; URLs and
email addresses are other examples);
– distributed agents (multicast and anycast groups are examples, but
there may be more complicated examples);
– mobile and intermittently connected agents, requiring time-dependent
addresses (I am concerned here with an agent moving between hosts,
rather than mobile hosts which are addressed in IPv6; only an agent
whose address or reachability changes faster than he can send updates
needs ONHS support in this case, others may just keep changing their
handle bindings);
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When considering whether to accommodate a proposed type of generalized
address, we should consider two key criteria:
1. whether the generalized address represents a new useful sort of ab-
stract or virtual agent;
2. whether the service provided by the generalized address can be sim-
ulated effectively and efficiently through direct communication be-
tween a querier and a more primitive type of address.
For example, anycast addresses are desirable because (1) they represent
distributed agents using several equivalent hosts to achieve reliability through
redundancy, and (2) they cannot be simulated effectively by a single ad-
dress, since the querier needs to know of the second address precisely when
the first is unreachable.
• We might wish to offer additional verification services to confirm impor-
tant updates, particularly irrevocable ones. For example, we might de-
lay execution of an irrevocable transfer while notifying the handle owner
through a designated email address and waiting for confirmation. But ev-
ery additional layer of verification adds a new administrative burden and
a new exposure to conflict, and it creates a new vulnerability to denial of
service, so we need to consider very carefully before offering such services.
Even optional services create the vulnerability of fraudulent exercise of
the option.
• As long as handle zones interleave with other domain name zones, a pro-
tocol to distinguish handle zones will be valuable.
4 Choosing a Hash Function
Since RSA public keys can be engineered to contain specific substrings, it is
important to apply a secure hash function. SHA1 appears to be the current
best practice. Individual handle owners may choose their own tradeoffs between
code length and collision insurance. So each handle key consists of at least 14
hexadecimal digits from the lower-order end of the 160-bit (40-hexadecimal-
digit) SHA1 hash of an RSA public key. We recommend at least 20 digits from
the hash, and there is often no harm in just using all 40 digits. As long as we
include leading zeroes, the code presents its own length.
In principle, there should be a native implementation of ONHS, with handles
stored in binary. For complete reliable compatibility with the current DNS, only
alphanumeric characters and hyphens are safe, and even case-dependence seems
risky. So base 64 is slightly out of reach. Base 32 is feasible, but base 16
(hexadecimal) is only 5/4 longer and it’s the usual way to present a hash key.
I also considered base 10 presentation of the hash code. But the length of base
10 numbers doesn’t correspond as cleanly with the length of binary numbers.
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5 ONHS on DNS with IPv6
The implementation of ONHS in DNS depends on DNAME resource records,
which are associated with the transition to IPv6, but do not depend on it.
Without DNAME support, CNAME allows delegation only of leaf handles.
Since ONHS doesn’t manipulate IP addresses except to store them when
assigned to handles and return them unchanged in response to resolution queries,
upgrade of DNS to IPv6 automatically upgrades ONHS. IPv6 handle servers
merely store AAAA or A6 records instead of A records.
6 Comparison to Related Systems
6.1 Domain Name System
The Domain Name System (DNS) appears to have been designed primarily as
a system to provide permanent handles that can be reassigned to different ad-
dresses to accommodate slow mobility of hosts, reassignment of functions to
different hosts, and changes in addressing dictated by changes in network topol-
ogy and routing efficiency. It was designed before public-key techniques were
widely deployed, and used textual names to make handles easier to remember,
type, and communicate out of band. As a result, DNS today is known largely
as a particular distributed hierarchical directory of names. The meaning re-
lationships in the name hierarchy compete with the pure ownership authority
relationships, and arguably dominate them at least near the root [DNS].
ONHS is essentially a restriction of DNS service to meaningless numerical
handles, abandoning support of the convenience and value of meaningful names
to other related services, such as DNS. By supporting only the continuity of
handles, without the human meaning of names, ONHS hopes to derive two
advantages:
• self-assignment of handles through public-key techniques;
• avoidance of conflict over the meanings of names.
Although a handle, by itself, is inherently less valuable than a name with
a handle, by unbundling we should be able to provide handles more promiscu-
ously, efficiently, and cheaply, and to free them from the competition-generated
scarcity and conflict associated with names.
6.1.1 Security Extensions
ONHS can take advantage of public-key cryptographic functionality in the DNS
security extensions [DNSSEC]. But the intention and expected effect of the use
of cryptographic techniques in ONHS is quite different from DNSSEC.
Signatures in DNSSEC are intended to authenticate communications among
name servers and between name servers and resolvers. The authority for a
particular record is invested in a name server. A signature with that server’s
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key insures that the particular name server is the true source of the record. The
association of a public key with the identity of a name server is itself signed
by a higher authority, using a chain of trust up to some security root authority
whose key is distributed reliably out of band.
Authority in ONHS is invested directly in the public keys themselves. No
particular handle server is invested with authority as a handle server. Of course,
keys and handle servers are likely to be co-owned, but ONHS takes no particular
interest in, nor responsibility for authenticating, this co-ownership.
Handle servers are responsible for best effort resolution of handles to ad-
dresses, but are not responsible for the correctness of individual resolutions.
Anyone who is dissatisfied with the performance of existing handle servers may
operate, or contract with a third party for the operation of, an additional server
to improve the rate of correct resolutions. A rogue handle server may cause
denial of service by flooding, but by itself it may not cause a querier to use a
fraudulent resolution.
The hierarchical structure of handle space allows construction of chains of
trust, but these are not normally used with public-key handles. Rather, each
public-key handle is normally thought of as an independent security root. ONHS
creates no trust in any handle, but it allows individual transactions providing
trust through out-of-band mechanisms to accumulate reliably around a handle
(or even a transfer chain of handles). The chain of trust approach may be used to
incorporate authentication techniques weaker than public-key techniques, such
as password-authenticated handle updates.
6.2 Uniform Resource Names
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has a working group on Uniform
Resource Names (URN). URNs are ”persistent identifiers for information re-
sources.” At the motivational level, the mission of URNs appears very similar
to that of ONHS handles. But the URN working group has concerned itself
very much with the semantic relationships between URNs imposed by various
authorities. To my knowledge they have not proposed any sort of self-assigned
URNs [URN].
A successful implementation of ONHS handles could provide the persistence
required of URNs, allowing the URN project to focus more on additional services
to establish semantic relationships.
6.3 Uniform Resource Identifiers
A related working group is concerned with Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI).
A URI is ”a compact string of characters for identifying an abstract or physical
resource.” URIs appear to be intended as a broader class of objects, including
URNs as well as less persistent identifiers [URI]. I expect that URIs will re-
solve to URNs, but I’m not sure I’ve understood the working groups’ intentions
correctly. The URI working group appears to be particularly concerned with
human readability, which is not at all a concern of ONHS.
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6.4 Simple Public Key Infrastructure; Simple Distributed
Security Infrastructure
A working group on Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) merged with
Ronald Rivest’s and Butler Lampson’s Simple Distributed Security Infrastruc-
ture (SDSI) project. A key component of SPKI/SDSI formalizes the use of
names across different naming contexts. Whenever Sally uses the name ”Paul”
for one agent, who uses the name ”George” for another agent, we may re-
fer to ”Sally’s Paul’s George.” Chains of names are rooted in self-assigned
public-key names [SPKI]. ONHS is essentially a hierarchical specialization of
the SPKI/SDSI naming system, limiting the use of names so that they resolve
only to network addresses.
6.5 Open Privacy Initiative’s Nyms
ONHS’s basic idea of public keys as handles, allowing an accumulation of trust,
is the same idea already used by the Open Privacy Initiative (OPI) in its Nyms.
Nyms are public-key handles, with additional capabilities. For example, the
owner of several nyms may prove their relation at will, or keep it private [OPI-
Nym]. So far, I haven’t seen the need for that service in ONHS. I hope that it
may be added to basic ONHS service by a separate service, when an application
demands it. OPI also provides tools to accumulate good and bad reputation
around a Nym. ONHS provides handles as anchors for such accumulation, but
does not support the accumulation itself. Essentially, ONHS is the application
of the Nym idea purely to network addressing, leaving all other useful functions
with Nyms to add-on services.
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8 Security Considerations
ONHS doesn’t appear to generate any substantial new security risks. It is
vulnerable to the same sorts of attacks as other uses of DNS. If the system is
not advertised clearly and honestly, users might depend on it for verification of
identity, which it does not provide, leading to attacks on those users based on
their credulity.
I believe that a root handle zone may be operated as a fully compliant
secure zone. But it must mark all of the subzones for individual handle owners
as insecure, so knowing the security of a root handle zone is not very helpful.
And the actual security value of the root handle zone signatures is very small.
Although ONHS is implementable under DNS, the totally distributed au-
thentication model in the conceptual foundations of ONHS does not match the
chain-of-trust model in the foundations of the DNS security extensions. It is
probably best to just treat all handle zones as insecure from the point of view
of DNS.
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8.1 Confidentiality
ONHS is not at all concerned with confidentiality. ONHS data are completely
public. Agents desiring confidentiality must find other means to achieve it.
Encryption of ONHS messages might be used as a defense against man-in-the-
middle attacks, but it should not be used for basic confidentiality, since any
Internet user may query the entire handle data.
8.2 Data Integrity
The ONHS root handle server is not directly and essentially concerned with the
data integrity of handle bindings. Each querier may verify the authenticity of
signed bindings for himself. But a failure of data integrity within the system may
damage the performance of the ONHS system, either flooding it with inauthentic
messages or even causing authentic data to be ignored or discarded. Each handle
owner may protect against permanent loss of data by keeping her own archive.
So the real problem is that internal failure of data integrity leads to denial of
service.
There is no complete defense against denial of service by flooding at the level
of ONHS. By verifying each signature before storing a record in its database,
a handle server limits the transmission of inauthentic packets and reduces, but
does not eliminate, the impact of a flooding attack.
8.3 Peer Entity Authentication
Like data integrity, peer entity authentication is not absolutely crucial to the
internal operations of ONHS. Each record is recognizably authentic or inauthen-
tic on its own. An impostor name server who transmits authentic records does
little or no harm, as long as resolvers and queriers avoid drawing conclusions
beyond the official meanings of the records.
On the other hand, ONHS provides a tool that may help authentication
of the handle owner by the querier, directly by connecting the querier to an
address provided on the authority of the handle owner, and incidentally by
providing a public key that the querier and handle owner may choose to use
for further authentication. But ONHS does not provide any sort of assurance
of the identity or other quality of the handle owner. Such assurance must be
derived from communications with the address provided by the handle owner,
or through other services that link to handle space in some way.
8.4 Nonrepudiation
Nonrepudiation is not very important to ONHS operations. ONHS provides
connections allowing queriers and handle owners to communicate. All qualities
affecting the two agents’ satisfaction should be determined by the content of
that communication and/or other services outside of ONHS.
For auditing purposes, it is helpful that the signatures on bindings and cer-
tain negative results (NXT) are hard to repudiate by the handle owner, but the
O’Donnell Informational [Page 37]
Internet Draft (0.4) Open Network Handles in DNS September 5 2002
inability to identify the handle owner limits the value of that nonrepudiation.
It is also helpful that the handle server’s signatures on its metadata are hard to
repudiate. This nonrepudiation is mostly useful for voluntary debugging of the
system, since a handle server should not provide strong warranties of service.
The nonrepudiation quality of ONHS operations is only at the level of public-
key signature, and therefore only valuable under the assumption that the key has
not been discovered by an adversary, and that no adversary has tricked an agent
into signing the wrong record. But the potential damage due to repudiation is
also light. ONHS only takes responsibility for carrying out resolution according
to correctly signed records. Each handle owner bears the consequences of her
own competence or incompetence in key management.
8.5 Systems Security, Unauthorized and Inappropriate Us-
age
ONHS implemented on DNS has little or no impact on systems security. Vul-
nerabilities are essentially those of the DNS bind software. There is a small
additional exposure of the handle root name server due to the fact that it com-
municates subzone data with unknown parties, but as long as it limits that
communication to accepting signed resource records it should be easy to pre-
vent attacks through such communication.
Perhaps the most serious security problems introduced by ONHS will come
from attacks on queriers who accept unsubstantiated claims of authenticity
based merely on ONHS’s response to queries. To defend against those attacks,
we should educate end users and those who provide them with handle-aware
software to present the meaning of handle resolution honestly, accurately, and
understandably. These attacks on queriers may also harm handle owners who
depend too strongly on ONHS to guarantee connections and thereby lose im-
portant correspondents. A handle owner may also be harmed if she is blamed
for behavior of an attacker who hijacks the handle. A service that connects a
handle to some other information about reputation or identity should take its
own steps to defend against the consequences of handle hijacking.
The ability to notify ONHS of a compromised password and cancel it irre-
vocably is a final defense for a handle owner against unauthorized use of the
handle. The use of irrevocable cancellation reduces the consequences of unau-
thorized use to denial of service. The seriousness of this denial depends on the
value of the connections with queriers enabled by the handle, and the difficulty
of re-establishing those connections out of band. The handle owner whose han-
dle is particularly valuable should use longer keys and stronger key-management
techniques proportional to the potential damage.
A client of a password-authenticated handle service is vulnerable to sniffed
or cracked passwords. But standard SSL and/or ssh techniques may be used to
avoid passing passwords in plaintext. The owner of a password-authenticated
handle may not be able to use compromise announcement and cancellation as a
last defense, since an attacker may change the password very quickly. The con-
sequences of password change may be reduced by always implementing password
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change as irrevocable transfer to a new handle with the new password. But pass-
word authentication is so inherently weak that we should probably concentrate
on making sure that all handles valuable enough to be worth a serious cracking
effort are protected by stronger techniques instead of on minor improvements
to the password mechanism.
The provider of password-authenticated passwords may defend against pass-
word sniffing/cracking attacks by confirming updates through a predetermined
email address. But every additional layer of confirmation provides another po-
tential point for denial of service attack, so such layers should not be added
without careful consideration.
8.6 Denial of Service
Denial of service by flooding is probably the threat to ONHS operations that is
hardest to defend against. ONHS exposure is probably essentially the same as
general DNS exposure, whether ONHS is implemented on DNS or independently.
ONHS may suffer somewhat greater exposure, since it inherently must commu-
nicate with unknown handle owners. But the loose connection works both ways.
Each handle owner is responsible for her own handle server. ONHS’s obligation
to an individual handle owner is light. A handle root server may systemati-
cally refuse communication from an IP address that has been flooding it, with
relatively small service consequences from the refusal.
An adversary may use ONHS to try to direct innocent traffic to an inappro-
priate address as part of a denial of service by flooding attack on that address.
This is essentially the same as the ”slashdot effect.” The adversary may obtain
the handle legitimately, but he must advertise some attractive quality for the
handle outside of the system. Since the adversary could just as well advertise
such a quality for the IP address, or for a domain name, the added exposure
due to ONHS is small or nil.
Defense against denial of service by flooding using ONHS as an intermedi-
ary to channel innocent traffic to an inappropriate address should be defended
mostly by counteradvertising in the same or similar channel to that used by the
attacker. In an extreme case, a handle server administrator may cease resolving
a given handle on the well authenticated objection of the owner of the address
to which the handle has been assigned. But that step should be taken with care,
since it opens up a new line of denial of service attack by an adversary posing
as the owner of the address. When IPv6 is widely deployed, the victim of such
a flooding attack can probably defend by changing the IP address.
8.7 Types of Attack
8.7.1 Eavesdropping
ONHS is immune to eavesdropping by itself, since all of its data are public
anyway. An eavesdropper only learns what he might have learned by querying
the system, or through a procsy who queries the system. Eavesdropping may
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be a component of a man-in-the-middle attack, but eavesdropping alone does
no harm. The best defense against eavesdropping as a component of another
attack is probably encryption of ONHS messages.
8.7.2 Message Replay
ONHS defends against message replay in the same way that DNS does. It
follows the principle that every message in a distributed system must carry
its whole meaning internally. So a message replayed out of sequence does not
change the operation. This property is sometimes referred to as commutativity
plus idempotence. Final results depend only on the set of transactions, not on
the order or multiplicity. The serial number or time stamp in each update is
a key part of this defense: without it replay could reset a handle binding to
a previous, now invalid binding. Replay might enhance a denial of service by
flooding attack, by consuming more system resources before a message can be
discarded.
ONHS carries the principle of complete context-free meaning for each mes-
sage even farther than normal operations of DNS with security extensions.
DNSSEC applies this principle to the database content of messages, before the
signature, but it fails to follow the principle with respect to signatures. The
meaning of a signature in DNSSEC depends not only on the signature itself,
but also on the chain of trust by which the signature is attached to an authority.
In ONHS, the signature is bound to a handle by the value of the handle itself,
so the value of a signature is much less context-dependent. There’s no magic
here: ONHS makes a much weaker claim for the value of a signature since it
does not verify the connection between the signature key and any independently
identified agent.
This extra context-independence in ONHS doesn’t make it invulnerable to
any particular type of attack to which DNSSEC is vulnerable. It just reduces
the number of points of failure to one for a public-key handle, while DNSSEC
has a point of failure for each link in the chain of trust. And, to repeat and re-
emphasize, it reduces vulnerability while also reducing the strength of its claims
for its results.
8.7.3 Message Insertion
ONHS defends against message insertion by signing every message. A message
insertion attack requires a compromise of a handle owner’s key. Once the key
is compromised, an adversary may enter arbitrary fraudulent data in that han-
dle’s records. As long as the owner does not lose the key, she may still reduce
the damage to denial of service by announcing compromise and canceling the
handle. A quick-acting adversary may transfer the handle, but compromise an-
nouncements are recorded even after transfer, and reported to all who query the
old handle.
An adversary who transfers a handle captures traffic from those who query
the handle before the compromise announcement and replace their links with
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the new handle. A handle server may defend against this sort of hijacking by
reporting the compromise announcement to queriers of the target handle as well.
But that step should be taken only after careful consideration and out-of-band
authentication, since it provides a new way to attack the value of one handle
by transferring another to it, then declaring a compromise. This new sort of
attack can be carried out with a handle acquired legitimately by the attacker,
so it is quite easy. A service to report transitive compromises should probably
be implemented as a separate registry outside of ONHS, with very carefully
thought out authentication methods.
The harm of the message insertion attack may be increased by a man in the
middle attack (Section 8.7.6) that delays the handle owner’s discovery of the
fraud.
8.7.4 Message Deletion
ONHS is vulnerable to message deletion. The main harm of message deletion is
denial of service. Message deletion by itself does not yield fraudulent results. An
attacker may use message deletion to prolong a handle-address binding beyond
its validity. Then, if the attacker compromises the old address, he might hijack
some traffic. But as long as the relevant key is not compromised, each querier
may discover the fraud, reducing the harm to denial of service. Harm may be
reduced further by the handle owner’s use of relatively short expiration dates on
bindings, but that also only reduces the harm from message hijacking to denial
of service.
More positive defenses against message deletion are multiple redundant com-
munication paths, through multiple redundant handle servers, and confirmation
with resend, so that the attacker must accomplish several co-ordinated deletions.
A handle owner should verify every important update by a test query to confirm
the effect.
Eavesdropping plus message deletion plus insertion may also be used to
thwart a defense against fraudulent update that uses confirmation, e.g. by
email, particularly if the confirmation uses less secure authentication (which
it is likely to do in the case of email confirmation). This is almost a man in
the middle attack, but it only requires control of the handle server’s end of the
channel, not the handle owner’s end.
The harm of message deletion attacks may be increased by a man in the
middle attack (Section 8.7.6) that delays the handle owner’s discovery of the
fraud.
8.7.5 Message Modification
ONHS vulnerability to message modification is essentially the same as to mes-
sage insertion. An attacker who discovers a secret key may send any sort of
message just as easily as modifying a legitimate message. Modification instead
of construction from scratch may allow the attacker to make the fraudulent
message more credible to out-of-band auditing. But essentially, modification
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is not a problem unless the key is compromised, and then the handle becomes
worthless and potentially harmful to legitimate users.
8.7.6 Man in the Middle
Basic ONHS operations are not vulnerable to man in the middle attacks, since
each transaction is atomic, except of course when the man in the middle has
discovered a private key. Once a handle owner’s private key is compromised, a
man in the middle may delay the handle owner’s discovery of the compromise
indefinitely, by returning correct results to all test queries by the handle owner
while sending incorrect updates to the handle server. The best defense against
this sort of attack is probably multiple communication paths through multiple
handle servers, so that the man in the middle must cover a broader middle. In
particular, a handle owner worried about such an attack should make covert
queries through procsies to verify correct updates to her handle records.
A man in the middle may also thwart the defense against fraudulent updates
using reconfirmation through alternate channels. In this case the man in the
middle may either provide no information at all to the handle owner, or he may
give the handle owner a false impression that she has thwarted a fraudulent
transaction. This is probably mostly a threat against password-authenticated
handles, since the owner of a public-key handle should immediately announce a
compromise and cancellation after thwarting a fraudulent update. If the man
in the middle can intercept and discard those announcements, but produce
confirmation of them, he can delay discovery of the harm indefinitely.
The handle owner’s best defense is probably multiple channels of commu-
nication to broaden the coverage required of the attacker. The handle owner
and handle server may agree to defend by also requiring multiple confirmations
through different channels. But each additional confirmation is an additional
point of attack for denial of service.
Encryption of traffic, even though the traffic itself need not be confidential,
defends against the man in the middle by giving him one more secret key to
discover.
A man in the middle may also destroy or falsify audit trails. Handle owners
and other auditors may defend with periodic spot check audit queries and ap-
peals to the archival logs, through multiple channels to multiple handle servers.
There is essentially no defense against a man in the middle with sufficient
power. If the man in the middle controls all channels of communication to any
agent, and has discovered all secret keys, he can create a complete false reality,
and trick the agent into actions that void any sort of mathematical security. We
cross our fingers that our adversaries will never be quite that powerful.
9 ANA Considerations
The proposed DNS implementation of ONHS uses the IANA DNS Security
Algorithm Numbers. Since the cryptographic concerns of DNS and ONHS are
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very similar, I expect that future updates to these numbers will continue to
support both services. I don’t anticipate any demands on IANA from ONHS
in the foreseeable future. If an ONHS implementation on DNS is sufficiently
popular, and if there are many different handle zones, then we may want some
way to distinguish handle zones from other DNS zones, and that may call for
an assignment of a code by IANA.
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